Abstract-Electro-Magnetic Analysis has been recently identified as an efficient technique to retrieve the secret key of cryptographic algorithms. Although similar from a mathematical point of view, Power or Electro-Magnetic Analyses have different advantages in practice. Among the advantages of EM analysis, the feasibility of attacking limited and bounded area of integrated systems is the key one. However, efficient techniques are required to localize hot spots, characterized by partially data-dependent electromagnetic emissions, at which a Differential Electro-Magnetic Analysis (DEMA) may be applied with success to retrieve the secret key. This paper aims at introducing a pragmatic technique to localize quickly and efficiently these points of interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last century, modern cryptology has mainly focused on defining cryptosystems resistant against theoretical attacks. However, with the increasing use of secure embedded systems like smartcards, researchers focused on exploiting the physical syndromes leaking from secure devices during a cryptographic operation to disclose the key. As a result, a new kind of attack called Side-Channel Attack (SCA) has appeared. Among the known attacks, some exploit the timing behavior of Integrated Circuits (IC) [1] , while others exploit the global power consumed by IC such as the well known Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [2] . Recently, the ElectroMagnetic (EM) emanations of embedded systems have been identified as a major threat [3] [4] . The efficiency of the EM channel is mainly due to the inner properties of EM emissions. Their ability to propagate through different materials is the most interesting one since it allows an attacker targeting the bounded hardware area to integrate the cryptographic algorithm under attack or part of it. This is all the more interesting since it also allows getting round global hardware countermeasures against power analyses such as the use of detached power supplies [5] by focusing the analysis on reduced die areas. However, this requires the use of small magnetic sensors to localize the leaking spots and thus, implies a quadratic increase (with the square of the ratio between the length of the measured chip and the size of the sensor) of the number of points to be attacked using Differential ElectroMagnetic Analyses (DEMA) [3] [4] . Thus, according to the magnetic sensor size, it could be very long and tedious for an attacker to apply DEMA on each possible position above the package or circuit. Within this context, our contribution is a practical technique allowing the localization of hardware modules involved in the cryptographic operation, by localizing die areas with partially data-dependent electromagnetic emanations. The proposed technique has several interesting properties. Firstly, it requires only few EM measurements to be efficiently applied. Secondly, it remains efficient (a) even in presence of data-independent EM emanations such as the ones generated by the clock tree or any 'always on' analogue blocks but also (b) in presence fully data-independent parasitic emissions such as noise. Thirdly, it allows finding positions where DEMA might be successful with a reduced set of EM traces. Finally, as last advantage, this non invasive and contactless technique can be applied with success, as demonstrated in Section 3, even if the circuit under attack is encapsulated. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces theoretical explanations about the proposed localization technique called W eighted Global M agnitude Squared Incoherence (W GMSI)technique and how to couple W GMSI technique with EM near field scanning systems. Section 3 presents some concrete results related to the application of W GMSI localization technique to different mappings on FPGA of a same design. This section also demonstrates the efficiency of W GMSI cartography to guide DEMA. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
II. GLOBAL MAGNITUDE SQUARED INCOHERENCE

A. Problem definition
Let us consider, for simplicity, that there are only two local sources of EM emissions within the chip: the source CB (corresponding to the cryptographic block) which is data-dependent, and a source S (such as clock, or an always on analogue block), which is data-independent. In that case, if a probe placed close to the IC surface but far from CB and close to S collects: only a small fraction of the data-dependent emissions radiated by CB (since the magnetic field amplitude decreases rapidly as the square or the cube of the distance [6] ) and large portion of the emissions of S. On the contrary, if the probe is placed really close to CB, the probe collects a large fraction of the data-dependent emissions radiated by CB during its operation and a small portion of the emissions of S. From the considerations above, one may conclude that positioning the probe close to the coprocessor CB, results in collecting time domain traces differing significantly one from another, and therefore, that it is easy to localize the cryptographic module. However, these last claims do not hold ! Indeed, if the EM emissions radiated by the source S are significantly greater than the emissions of the CB or, if S and CB sources are really close one from the other, it is still extremely difficult to localize CB, even if the probe is placed just above, since most of the signal collected by the probe is generated by S. As a result, any localization technique based on time domain amplitude analyses may not work in presence of large EM data-independent emanations sources such as clock generators, PLL or I/O interfaces, or even in presence of large environmental electromagnetic noise sources. As an illustration, Fig.1c shows a map revealing the maximum amplitude of the EM emissions measured at several coordinates of the FPGA package surface during a DES ciphering (this EM emission maps has been obtained with the experimental setup introduced Section 3). Fig.1b is an X-Ray photography of the package containing the circuit under attack. Finally, Fig.1a discloses the routing (obtained with Xilinx ISE tool suite) of the considered circuit, running at 50MHz and integrating a DES module, a finite state machine and a RS232 interface for communication purpose. As shown, it appears impossible to correlate Fig.1a with Fig.1c even if the die area is roughly known thanks to the X-Ray photography Fig.1b . It thus appears all the more difficult to identify the DES module on this kind of EM cartography and thus to decide where to position the magnetic sensors above the package to perform a successful CEMA only on the DES module, in order to avoid potential global hardware countermeasures such as [5] .
B. Fundamentals of Global Magnitude Squared Incoherence About the behavior of EM emissions of IC
DPA exploits by statistical means the data-dependent behavior of the switching current consumed by circuits during a computation of a cryptographic module. This behavior is due to inner properties of the CMOS logic which consumes energy (much more than in the idle state) only to switch from one logical state to another [7] . EM emissions of a circuit are mainly generated by flows of electrical charges through the different metal wires connecting logic gates but also trough wires supplying the circuit [6] [8] .
Since the switching of gates generates a current flow through the circuit interconnect, we may conclude that these switching generate some data-dependent EM emissions at different points in the circuit according to the power distribution network [6] [8] . These data-dependent behaviors may be exploited by statistical means, using for example DEMA [3] [4], to retrieve the secret key. Even if the magnitudes of both power consumption and computation time of logic cells are roughly known, it is extremely difficult to deduce any characteristic about the EM emissions generated by gates due to the complexity of the power distribution grid of actual IC. As a result, the only conclusion we may draw and consider in the remainder of the paper is that gates generates some EM perturbations and more precisely generates some data-dependent harmonics located somewhere in the whole EM emission spectrum. Within this context, the proposed technique allows disclosing the data-dependent behavior of EM emissions in the frequency domain without making any assumption on the EM emission characteristics. It is based on spectral incoherence analysis of two time domain signals as detailed below. The only observation on which is based the method is the following: considering two successive hardware operations, we are sure that some gates switch during one computation and does not switch during the other, while some gates switch during both operations. This leads to the following intuitive conclusion that guides the development of our proposal: between two cryptographic operations some characteristics of the EM emissions remain constant (coherent) from one operation to another, while some character-ristics completely change (are incoherent). Such a behavior is said partially data-dependent in the rest of the paper and the proposed W GMSI technique aims at disclosing circuit areas characterized by this behavior.
Weighted Global Magnitude Squared Incoherence
The Magnitude Squared Coherence (M SC) between two signals w 1 (t) and w 2 (t) is a real-valued function of frequency with values between 0 and 1. It is defined by the following expression:
where P w1,w1 (f ), P w2,w2 (f ) are respectively the power spectral density of w 1 (t), w 2 (t), and P w1,w2 (f ) is the cross power spectral density of w 1 (t) and w 2 (t). At a given frequency f , a M SC(f ) value of 1 indicates that the two signal spectra have exactly the same amplitude i.e. are coherent while a value of 0 means that the signal spectra are different i.e. incoherent. Alternatively, one may compute the Mean Squared Incoherence M SI(f ) defined by (2) . This criterion has also its values between 0 and 1 but indicates rigorously the contrary of (1).
Considering the whole spectra of two sampled time domain signals, one may compute respectively the Weighted Global Magnitude Squared Coherence or Incoherence coefficients (W GMSC and W GMSI factors) between two time domain signals according to the definitions (3,4) that consider the signal w 2 (t) as a reference. In these definitions, nf is the number of frequency values at which the M SC(f ) and M SI(f ) coefficients are computed, BW is the considered frequency bandwidth and A w2(t) is the power spectrum amplitude at the f frequency.
W GMSI and W GMSC have values ranging between 0 and 1. Considering the W GMSI, a high value indicates that w 1 (t) and w 2 (t) have perfectly incoherent spectra, while a low value indicates the contrary. It is to be noted that the right hand term of (4) is a key term. Indeed, it weights M SI(f ) value such that fully incoherent and high amplitude harmonics have more impact on the final W GMSI value than fully incoherent but low amplitude harmonics. 
Illustrations
To illustrate the proposed definitions, 5 time domain EM traces were acquired during 5 different ciphering of a DES module (50M Hz). These traces, shown in Fig.2 , have been collected with 500μm diameter probe placed respectively above a DES module (Fig.2a) and above some nets distributing the clock signal (Fig.2b) . As a result, one may expect that curves Fig.2a are partially data-dependent traces while, waveforms Fig.2b are completely data-independent. To validate this assumption, M SC(f ) were computed. Fig.2c gives the M SC(f ) evolution with respect to frequency for both partially data-dependent and fully data-independent traces. As shown, the M SC(f ) values obtained considering traces collected above some clock nets have, as expected, values closer to 1 over a wider frequency range than the M SC(f ) values computed with traces collected above the DES module, validating the above discussion. The obtained M SC(f ) values were gathered to compute the W GMSI coefficients. As expected again, W GMSI values (Table 1 ) corresponding to acquisitions above the clock nets are two magnitude order lower than that corresponding to acquisitions above the DES. However, the latter values remain low meaning that only few harmonics are incoherent or that the amplitudes of those harmonics is significantly lower than those of coherent harmonics. Hence, the used term of partially data-dependent EM emission. Considering these results, one may consider that the W GMSI criterion appears efficient enough to differentiate a partially data-dependent behavior from a data-independent one and may be used during a magnetic near field scan of a circuit to localize area with partially data-dependent EM emissions.
C. Coupling W GMSI criterion with EM near field scanning
Coupling W GMSI analysis with Near Field Scanning system to localize the points characterized by partially datadependent EM emissions and thus leaking spots is straightforward. The basic idea is to collect for each (X,Y) coordinates above the integrated circuit at least two different time domain traces of the magnetic field corresponding to two different data processing. Finally, W GMSI values are computed for all (X,Y) positions. This provides W GMSI cartographies revealing positions characterized by partially data-dependent EM emissions. Note however, that computing W GMSI values for more than 
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To validate the effectiveness of the W GMSI analysis in localizing spots with partially data-dependent EM emissions, 2 kinds of validation were performed. The one aimed at correlating the obtained W GMSI cartographies with the design floorplans while the second aimed at demonstrating that spots characterized by the highest W GMSI values are good candidates for CEMA.
A. Analyzed Design
The two aforementioned validation steps were performed considering a design mapped onto a FPGA circuit and more precisely a Spartan3-1000 Digilent board. Note the Spartan die is encapsulated in a cavity-up Ball Grid Array (BGA) package. The mapped design integrates a RS232 block to communicate with the PC, a finite state machine that manages the communications and the behavior of the chip. Three different floorplans of this design were elaborated with ISE tool suite as shown Fig. 4 . This was done to definitively validate the efficiency of W GMSI map in disclosing area with partially data-dependent radiations.
B. W GMSI maps vs. design floorplans
W GMSI maps aim at disclosing (X,Y) coordinates at which the EM emissions captured by the probes are partially data-dependent. As a first validation, we therefore scanned the whole package surface during a DES ciphering operations and Fig. 3 . Circuit floorplans and related full package W GMSI maps obtained for the three considered mappings of the design computed the W GMSI maps for the 3 considered mappings. The expected result was, at least, to localize the DES module and more precisely to define an area (characterized by higher W GMSI values) containing the DES module or part of it since (a) the probe was placed at roughly 500μm from the die and (b) since EM waves are dispersive. Note that the distance from the probe to the die was estimated by removing the package of an identical FPGA and measuring the package thickness. This procedure also allowed measuring the die dimensions (incorporating the IO pads): roughly 8mm by 8mm. The whole package was scanned with a displacement step of 500μm. This resulted in acquiring EM emissions at 1156 coordinates for each mapping. It took 2 hours, for one mapping, to collect the EM emissions corresponding to 5 different encryptions. Note that to increase the Signal to Noise Ratio, each ciphering was performed 20 times and the average computed. Fig.3 shows the 3 obtained W GMSI maps. The lower left map of Fig.3 is to be compared to Fig.1c . This comparison demonstrates that W GMSI map provides more valuable information than a maximum time domain amplitude analysis.
Moreover and as expected the comparison of these maps with the corresponding floorplans demonstrates, considering the accuracy of the die size measure (0.5mm), that W GMSI criterion allows disclosing the hardware area corresponding to the DES module. One surprising point is that areas with partially data-dependent EM emissions have different size even if the DES module occupied roughly the same number of slices. This is especially true for W GMSI maps corresponding to mappings 1 and 2 that disclose significantly larger and smaller areas than that effectively occupied by the DES module. This is probably due to the power/ground network specificities effectively involved in the supply of the DES module in each mapping; supply rails being recognized as important sources of EM emanations [6] [8] . Nevertheless, as illustrated by Fig.4 , W GMSI cartographies allow selecting rationally a small number of points (typically 20 to 30 in our testcases) above the die among 256 as interesting candidates for Correlation Electro-Magnetic analysis (CEMA). Next paragraph aims at evaluating if these points are effectively good candidates for EM attacks.
C. W GMSI and EM analysis
In order to further evaluate the efficiency of the W GMSI criterion, a last validation step has consisted in elaborating a CEMA map of the mapping 3. Several EM attacks were thus performed at different positions of a package area above the die. The architecture of the DES co-processor being iterative with a fully parallel computation of a round in a clock period, it was therefore possible to use the Hamming distance model, considered as the most efficient when applicable. For each attacked position, 5000 EM traces were acquired; each trace was obtained by averaging 20 times the signal to increase the Signal to Noise Ratio. Then, we launched on each selected position CEMA attacks on 1 st and 16 th rounds, following the original CPA attack from Brier and al. [9] . More precisely, a correlation coefficient was computed, for each time sample, every time a new trace was collected. This was done to check the key guess stability by fixing an arbitrary threshold at 100 iterations with the good key to decide that CEMA has definitely found the key accordingly to the DPA contest rules [10] . Following this protocol, several maps were obtained; Fig.4 groups some of them. Fig.4a gives the percentages of correct guesses (among 4900 guesses done during the CPA), of the sub-key provided to Sbox1 during round 1. On this map, darkest areas correspond to highest percentages of correct guesses while (a) the black curve represents the boundary of the design3 and (b) black rings correspond to the 25 highest W GMSI points (among 256 values computed). It is to be noted that most of these points coincide with coordinates at which the percentage of right sub-key guesses is greater than 45%, which is a sufficiently high threshold to consider CEMA as successful. Fig.4b reveals areas at which the full key is obtained with the lowest number of traces. This map must be interpreted according to the following criterion: the darkest the area is, the lower is the number of traces required to disclose the full key. Note that white areas correspond to coordinates at which the CEMA failed. Once again, the right hand darkest areas coincide with some high W GMSI points.
The above results partially demonstrate the efficiency of the W GMSI criterion in selecting rationally few points to be attacked. Indeed, some coordinates at which an attacker may obtain a high percentage of correct guesses or the full key are not detected by W GMSI cartographies. To our opinion, these points correspond to a Gnd or Vdd rail close to the clock pad. This close vicinity with the clock pad reduces the weights involved in (4) due to high amplitude harmonics generated by the clock. As a result, the rank of these coordinates is lowered. There is thus room to improve the weighting policy of the M SI coefficients. To definitively demonstrate the interest of the W GMSI criterion as defined in this paper, we computed the percentage of points falling into W GMSI bins. This binning of the whole population done, we computed the percentage of successful CEMA attack in each bin. Fig.5 gives the results. As shown, the percentage of successful CEMA by bin increases with the W GMSI value validating the interest our proposal, while the percentage of points falling into the corresponding bins decreases with the W GMSI value.
IV. CONCLUSION
A new technique to localize Electro-Magnetic hot-spots in hardware cryptographic module was presented in this paper.
It is based on the assumption according to which: from a data processing to another one, EM emissions radiated by an integrated circuit have some coherent characteristics and some incoherent characteristics. This claimed property, called partially data-dependence of EM emissions, has been first validated experimentally by verifying its correctness with some measured traces. Then, we deduced from this observation, a localization technique. This technique allows (a) localizing cryptographic modules and more precisely leaking points thanks to EM near field mapping and (b) selecting rationally a reduced set of points of interests for electromagnetic analyses. Finally, concrete results have been given on an iterative DES mapped on a FPGA. These results have demonstrated the interest of using incoherence analysis of EM emissions.
